Does intensified communication of hedge funds with letters affect abnormal returns?

Andreas Oehler and Jonas Tobias Schmitz

International Review of Economics & Finance, 2021, vol. 76, issue C, 127-142

Abstract: Hedge funds go beyond their statements on the transaction purpose in Schedule 13D by stating their activism objectives in a letter to the corporate management. Anyhow, prior work does not examine the impact of the communication channel systematically. The content of the letters aims at enabling corporate management to understand the activism goals better. Therefore, the communication channel might reduce the perceived uncertainty regarding the expected activism value. Hence, we presume higher abnormal returns compared to events with no letter. Our results reveal that activism is related to positive reactions, but intensified communication per se is not the reason.

Keywords: Hedge fund activism; Tactical communication; Uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G11 G14 G18 G23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:reveco:v:76:y:2021:i:c:p:127-142

DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2021.05.004

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