The external effect of institutional cross-ownership on excessive managerial perks
Huan Liu and
Canran Hou
International Review of Economics & Finance, 2023, vol. 83, issue C, 483-501
Abstract:
Based on the objective of portfolio value maximization, this paper focuses on the external effect of institutional cross-ownership. Empirical results show that institutional cross-ownership is negatively related to excessive managerial perks and the negative relation is more prominent for state-owned enterprises (SOEs), or central SOEs. The main conclusions are unchanged when we perform endogeneity tests and several robust checks. Further, we conduct estimations on influence mechanisms and find that institutional cross-ownership can reduce excessive managerial perks through improving information environment and corporate governance. Especially, listed firms with institutional cross-ownership can achieve better future performance. Overall, this paper enriches existing literature on institutional cross-ownership and inspires a new direction to deepen discussions on SOEs’ reforms in China.
Keywords: Institutional cross-ownership; Excessive managerial perks; External effect; State-owned enterprises; China (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G11 G18 G23 G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1059056022002465
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:reveco:v:83:y:2023:i:c:p:483-501
DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2022.10.005
Access Statistics for this article
International Review of Economics & Finance is currently edited by H. Beladi and C. Chen
More articles in International Review of Economics & Finance from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().