Managing financial expertise
Koji Asano
International Review of Economics & Finance, 2024, vol. 89, issue PA, 351-365
Abstract:
We study credit markets in which lenders can invest in financial expertise to reduce the cost of acquiring information about underlying collateral. If the pledgeability of corporate income is low, information acquisition increases lending, but lenders reduce expertise acquisition because of the hold-up problem. By contrast, if the pledgeability is high, information acquisition reduces lending so that lenders can extract rents from firms by investing in financial expertise and creating fear of information acquisition. Optimal policy involves subsidizing investment in financial expertise when the pledgeability is low and taxing investment in financial expertise when the pledgeability is high.
Keywords: Financial expertise; Collateral; Information acquisition; Liquidity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 G20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)
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Working Paper: Managing Financial Expertise (2021) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:reveco:v:89:y:2024:i:pa:p:351-365
DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2023.07.101
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