Merger incentive and strategic corporate social responsibility by a multiproduct corporation

Arturo Garcia, Mariel Leal, Sang-Ho Lee and Chul-Hi Park ()

International Review of Economics & Finance, 2024, vol. 91, issue C, 193-206

Abstract: This study investigates a multiproduct corporation's strategic corporate social responsibility (CSR) and the merger decisions by single-plant rival firms. We examine two different timings of choosing strategic CSR games, “merge-then-CSR” and “CSR-then-merge.” In the former case where the merger decision is made first, the subsequently adopted level of CSR increases in product substitutability while its level with a merger is lower than that without a merger. In the latter case where a multiproduct corporation establishes a higher CSR level before merging with rival firms, the committed CSR level decreases in product substitutability while it can increase consumer surplus unless the products are close substitutes. Our findings highlight that mergers can be profitable and benefit society when multiproduct corporation has higher level of CSR.

Keywords: Multiproduct corporation; Strategic CSR; Timing of commitment; Products substitutability; Merger decision (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 L13 M14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1059056024000108
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:reveco:v:91:y:2024:i:c:p:193-206

DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2024.01.010

Access Statistics for this article

International Review of Economics & Finance is currently edited by H. Beladi and C. Chen

More articles in International Review of Economics & Finance from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().