Dynamic game analysis of E-commerce platform rewards and research & development investment of settled enterprises

Zhiyun Sheng and Ningning Ni

International Review of Economics & Finance, 2024, vol. 92, issue C, 1112-1125

Abstract: Contributing to the literature on the E-commerce platform governance, this paper analyzes the e-commerce platform's optimal reward strategy and settled enterprises' optimal Research & Development (R&D) investment decision with different R&D patterns. The results indicate that the platform's rewards can increase settled enterprises' R&D investment and overall benefit of the ecosystem. Under R&D competition pattern, the platform's optimal reward is positively correlated with the technology spillover effect. Under R&D cartels and RJV competition patterns, the platform's optimal reward will increase as the degree of product complementarity. Under R&D competition pattern, settled enterprises' R&D investment and product quality reach the optimum.

Keywords: E-commerce platform rewards; Settled enterprises' optimal research & development investment; Research & development pattern; Technology spillover effect; Product complementarity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C02 C15 C61 C63 D01 D50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:reveco:v:92:y:2024:i:c:p:1112-1125

DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2024.02.068

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