Fostering fintech innovation: A tripartite evolutionary game analysis of regulatory sandbox experiments

Yulu Zheng and Xiaoli Wu

International Review of Economics & Finance, 2024, vol. 92, issue C, 1302-1320

Abstract: The rapid integration of next-gen information technologies in finance has spurred FinTech innovation, posing challenges to regulation. Regulatory sandboxes are pivotal for fostering innovation. This study employs a FinTech innovation regulatory sandbox to analyze a tripartite evolutionary game involving government, FinTech enterprises, and the public. It examines strategic choices, equilibrium points, and the interplay of incentives and costs. Results highlight the pivotal role of FinTech companies. Recommendations include consistent government incentives to optimize resource allocation. In tepid engagement scenarios, FinTech companies and government entities lead the innovation adoption. In a context of significant technology spending, increasing initial willingness is crucial for optimize development.

Keywords: Evolutionary game model; Tripartite game analysis; Fintech innovation; Regulatory sandbox experiment; Financial technology (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:reveco:v:92:y:2024:i:c:p:1302-1320

DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2024.02.060

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