 Anti-corruption campaign and SOEs innovation: The role of the central inspection group in ChinaCong Nie, Xueren Zhang and Yue Yang International Review of Economics & Finance, 2024, vol. 96, issue PA Abstract: Using central inspections of China aimed at SOEs as a quasi-natural experiment, we investigate the causal effect of anti-corruption campaigns on the innovation of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Based on the sample of China's SOEs, we find that the central inspections lead to an uplift in the quantity of SOE innovation at the expense of innovation quality. Further analysis indicates that owing to the unique motivation of political promotion, SOE managers improve the operation indicators valued by the government when subjected to political intervention in the shape of anti-corruption, such as the innovation quantity, referred to as the political monitoring mechanism. Eventually, there will be a decline in the quality of innovation that will supplement the long-term value of SOEs since the central inspection does not contribute to corporate governance. Keywords: China'S SOEs; Central inspection group; Anti-corruption campaign; Innovation heterogeneity; Political monitoring effects (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:reveco:v:96:y:2024:i:pa:s1059056024005367 DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2024.103544 Access Statistics for this article International Review of Economics & Finance is currently edited by H. Beladi and C. Chen More articles in International Review of Economics & Finance from Elsevier |
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