Executive educational background and corporate strategic information disclosure

Kai Liu, Ditao Duan and Ruoyan Wang

International Review of Economics & Finance, 2024, vol. 96, issue PA

Abstract: This study analyzes the link between executives' educational background and corporate strategic information disclosure, and the empirical results show that in firms with higher levels of executive education, the higher the executives' educational level, the higher frequency of corporate disclosure, and the higher number of positive and negative announcements reported. In firms with lower levels of executive education, the higher education level of executives, the lower frequency of corporate disclosure, the more favourable announcements will be reported and the fewer negative announcements will be reported.

Keywords: Executive educational background; Strategic disclosure; Disclosure frequency; Disclosure content (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:reveco:v:96:y:2024:i:pa:s1059056024005562

DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2024.103564

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