 Cost asymmetry, commodity taxes and antidumping policiesKuang-Cheng Andy Wang, Ping-Yao Chou and Wen-Jung Liang International Review of Economics & Finance, 2024, vol. 96, issue PC Abstract: We examine how the presence of a commodity tax affects the superiority of an antidumping duty and a price undertaking policy under cost asymmetry between the foreign and domestic firms. We obtain several interesting results as follows. First, the domestic welfare under a price undertaking is higher than that under an antidumping duty, if the domestic firm is more efficient than the foreign firm and the normal value is large. Second, the presence of a commodity tax usually leads the domestic government to be more likely to choose an antidumping duty. Third, the presence of a commodity tax leads the foreign firm to prefer a price undertaking to an antidumping duty. The first two results show that the domestic firm's lower efficiency and the commodity tax can explain why the cases involving adopting a price undertaking are far fewer than those concerned with an antidumping duty in the real world. Keywords: Price undertaking; Antidumping duty; Commodity taxes; Cost differential (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:reveco:v:96:y:2024:i:pc:s105905602400697x DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2024.103705 Access Statistics for this article International Review of Economics & Finance is currently edited by H. Beladi and C. Chen More articles in International Review of Economics & Finance from Elsevier |
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