Institutional shareholding, corporate financialization, and regulatory penalties for listed companies

Jingyi Guo, Yinglong Zheng, Shilin Du and Tian, Grace (Li)

International Review of Economics & Finance, 2025, vol. 99, issue C

Abstract: This study selects data from publicly listed companies from 2009 to 2022 as samples to examine the impact of institutional shareholding and corporate financialization on the penalties imposed on listed companies for violations. The empirical results indicate that institutional shareholding can effectively reduce the risk of penalties for violations by listed companies; corporate financialization increases the risk of penalties for violations by listed companies; institutional shareholding plays a mediating role between corporate financialization and the risk of penalties for violations by listed companies; there is heterogeneity in the impact of corporate financialization on the risk of penalties for violations between state-owned and private enterprises; the impact of corporate financialization on the risk of penalties for violations by listed companies exhibits a threshold effect, which varies with changes in company size.

Keywords: Institutional shareholding; Corporate financialization; Penalty for violations; Threshold effect (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:reveco:v:99:y:2025:i:c:s1059056025001613

DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2025.103998

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