Analyzing the governance structure of French banking groups

Faten Ben Bouheni, Abdoulkarim Idi Cheffou and Fredj Jawadi

Research in International Business and Finance, 2018, vol. 44, issue C, 40-48

Abstract: We analyze the governance structure of three main French banking groups (BNP Paribas, Crédit Agricole, and Société Générale) in the context of the global financial crisis. To this end, We, first, show the heterogeneity within the ownership structures of these three banks, which points differences with regard to performance among these banks. Second, we underscore the importance of institutional investors in stimulating banking growth. Finally, we note that the high number of independent directors on the boards of directors of BNP Paribas and Société Générale as well as the use of incentive pay in executive compensation might explain the excess risk taking of these banks.

Keywords: Board of directors; Ownership structure; Incentive pay; Bank; Financial crisis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:riibaf:v:44:y:2018:i:c:p:40-48

DOI: 10.1016/j.ribaf.2017.05.016

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