Analyzing the governance structure of French banking groups

Faten Ben Bouheni (), Abdoulkarim Idi Cheffou and Fredj Jawadi
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Faten Ben Bouheni: ISC Paris - Institut Supérieur du Commerce de Paris
Abdoulkarim Idi Cheffou: OCRE - Observatoire et Centre de Recherche en Entrepreneuriat - EDC - EDC Paris Business School

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Abstract: We analyze the governance structure of three main French banking groups (BNP Paribas, Crédit Agricole, and Société Générale) in the context of the global financial crisis. To this end, We, first, show the heterogeneity within the ownership structures of these three banks, which points differences with regard to performance among these banks. Second, we underscore the importance of institutional investors in stimulating banking growth. Finally, we note that the high number of independent directors on the boards of directors of BNP Paribas and Société Générale as well as the use of incentive pay in executive compensation might explain the excess risk taking of these banks.

Keywords: Board of directors; Ownership structure; Incentive pay; Bank; Financial crisis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-04
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Published in Research in International Business and Finance, 2018, 44, pp.40-48. ⟨10.1016/j.ribaf.2017.05.016⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03145169

DOI: 10.1016/j.ribaf.2017.05.016

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