Satisficing in strategic environments: A theoretical approach and experimental evidence

Werner Güth (), Maria Levati and Matteo Ploner

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), 2010, vol. 39, issue 5, 554-561

Abstract: The satisficing approach is generalized and applied to finite n-person games. We formally define the concept of satisficing and propose a theory that allows satisficing players to make "optimal" decisions without being equipped with any prior. We also review some experiments on strategic games illustrating and partly supporting our theoretical approach.

Keywords: Strategic; interaction; Satisficing; behavior; Bounded; rationality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6W5H ... 562c0016ac854cb73139
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Satisficing in strategic environments: a theoretical approach and experimental evidence (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:soceco:v:39:y:2010:i:5:p:554-561

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics) is currently edited by Pablo Brañas Garza

More articles in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics) from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().