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Public good provision, punishment, and the endowment origin: Experimental evidence

Armenak Antinyan, Luca Corazzini and Daniel Neururer

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), 2015, vol. 56, issue C, 72-77

Abstract: This paper studies contributions and punishments in a linear public good game, where group members have different sources of endowment. We compare the behavior of homogeneous groups, in which subjects are exogenously assigned the same endowments, with that of heterogeneous groups, in which half the group members have to exert effort to earn their endowments (effort subjects) and the other half are endowed with a windfall of equal value (windfall subjects).

Keywords: Endowment origin; Linear public good game; Punishment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C92 D63 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Working Paper: Public Good Provision, Punishment and the Endowment Origin: Experimental Evidence (2014) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:soceco:v:56:y:2015:i:c:p:72-77

DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2015.03.007

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