An experimental examination of compensation schemes and level of effort in differentiated tasks

Hiromasa Takahashi, Junyi Shen and Kazuhito Ogawa ()

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), 2016, vol. 61, issue C, 12-19

Abstract: We examine the influence of different compensation schemes on the exertion of effort in completing differentiated tasks. The first task is assumed to be boring and has no intrinsic motivation, while the second is assumed to be interesting and has intrinsic motivation. The results are as follows: (1) for the first task, effort levels were lower for high fixed pay than low fixed pay and no payment and were higher for low incentive pay than high incentive pay and no payment. (2) Standard economic theory holds for the second task, which predicts that the higher the incentive, the more effort an individual will exert and the greater the performance, on an average.

Keywords: Real effort experiment; Intrinsic motivation; Loss aversion; Fixed pay; Incentive pay (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J33 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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Related works:
Working Paper: An Experimental Examination of Compensation Schemes and Level of Effort in Differentiated Tasks (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:soceco:v:61:y:2016:i:c:p:12-19

DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2016.01.002

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