An Experimental Examination of Compensation Schemes and Level of Effort in Differentiated Tasks

Hiromasa Takahashi, Junyi Shen and Kazuhito Ogawa ()

No DP2014-20, Discussion Paper Series from Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University

Abstract: We examine the influence of different compensation schemes on exertion of effort for differentiated tasks. The first type of task is assumed to be boring and has no intrinsic motivation, while the second is assumed to be interesting, and has a higher intrinsic motivation. The results are as follows: (1) in the first task, standard economic theory, which claims higher pay should result in higher effort, does not hold. (2) Standard economic theory holds for the second task, which predicts that the higher the incentive, the more effort one exerts, and achieves a higher performance on average.

Keywords: Real effort experiment; Intrinsic motivation; Loss aversion; Fixed pay; Incentive pay (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J33 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2014-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cta, nep-exp and nep-hrm
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https://www.rieb.kobe-u.ac.jp/academic/ra/dp/English/DP2014-20.pdf First version, 2014 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: An experimental examination of compensation schemes and level of effort in differentiated tasks (2016)
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