Time pressure and honesty in a deception game
Valerio Capraro (),
Jonathan Schulz () and
David G. Rand
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), 2019, vol. 79, issue C, 93-99
Previous experiments have found mixed results on whether honesty is intuitive or requires deliberation. Here we add to this literature by building on prior work of Capraro (2017). We report a large study (N = 1,389) manipulating time pressure vs time delay in a deception game. We find that, in this setting, people are more honest under time pressure, and that this result is not driven by confounds present in earlier work.
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:soceco:v:79:y:2019:i:c:p:93-99
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