EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Is dishonesty persistent?

Michèle Belot and Jeroen van de Ven ()

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), 2019, vol. 83, issue C

Abstract: We study if (dis)honest behavior is persistent. We investigate this by exposing participants to different incentives to lie over time. Some participants are first exposed to high incentives and then to lower incentives; for others the reverse. If (dis)honest behavior is persistent, the propensity to lie depends on past incentives. We find no evidence of persistence in honest or dishonest behavior. Exposing participants first to high incentives does not result in a lasting positive effect on dishonesty after the incentives are lowered away. Similarly, after correcting for a time trend, subjects still respond strongly to high incentives after facing low incentives.

Keywords: Lying; Dishonesty; Persistence; Habits; Incentives; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214804319300357
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:soceco:v:83:y:2019:i:c:s2214804319300357

DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2019.101464

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics) is currently edited by Pablo Brañas Garza

More articles in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics) from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:eee:soceco:v:83:y:2019:i:c:s2214804319300357