Team competition when there is within-team inequality

Shaun P. Hargreaves Heap, Abhijit Ramalingam and Brock Stoddard

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), 2021, vol. 90, issue C

Abstract: In experiments, contributions to a team public good increase when the team competes with another team for a prize. In our experiment, this insight generalises to internally unequal teams. Indeed, in some cases the boost to public goods contributions is bigger with unequal teams than equal ones. We also find that the boost to contributions is most significant among the ‘rich’ in the team. Hence, competition not only promotes efficiency, it also reduces inequality in our experiment.

Keywords: Public goods; Experiment; Team competition; Inequality; Within group; Productivity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 C92 D31 D63 D72 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:soceco:v:90:y:2021:i:c:s2214804320300574

DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2020.101614

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