Social preferences across different populations: Meta-analyses on the ultimatum game and dictator game
Julie Le Gallo (),
Nikolaos Georgantzís () and
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), 2021, vol. 90, issue C
We perform meta-regressions on a single database containing 96 observations of simple ultimatum games and 144 observations of simple dictator games to disentangle the fairness hypothesis based on the degree of economic development of a country. According to the fairness hypothesis, offers in the two games should not differ if they were motivated by a subject’s fairness concerns. Using the difference across countries between offers in ultimatum and dictator games, we address the effect of being exposed to the market mechanism on pure fairness concerns and other-regarding, expectations-driven fairness. Our results show in particular that the lower the level of economic development in a country, the less likely the rejection of the fairness hypothesis.
Keywords: ultimatum game; dictator game; meta-analysis; social preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C13 C78 D03 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Working Paper: Social preferences across different populations: Meta-analyses on the ultimatum game and dictator game (2021)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:soceco:v:90:y:2021:i:c:s2214804320302895
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics) is currently edited by Ofer Azar
More articles in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics) from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().