Social preferences across different populations: Meta-analyses on the ultimatum game and dictator game
Francois Cochard (),
François Cochard (),
Julie Le Gallo (),
Nikolaos Georgantzís () and
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Francois Cochard: CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (EA 3190) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE]
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We perform meta-regressions on a single database containing 96 observations of simple ultimatum games and 144 observations of simple dictator games to disentangle the fairness hypothesis based on the degree of economic development of a country. According to the fairness hypothesis, o ers in the two games should not di er if they were motivated by a subject's fairness concerns. Using the di erence across countries between o ers in ultimatum and dictator games, we address the e ect of being exposed to the market mechanism on pure fairness concerns and other-regarding, expectations-driven fairness. Our results show in particular that the lower the level of economic development in a country, the less likely the rejection of the fairness hypothesis.
Keywords: D64; D03; C78; social preferences JEL Classification: C13; social preferences; meta-analysis; dictator game; ultimatum game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Published in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, Elsevier Inc., 2021, 90 (en ligne), pp.101613. ⟨10.1016/j.socec.2020.101613⟩
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Journal Article: Social preferences across different populations: Meta-analyses on the ultimatum game and dictator game (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02974685
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