Asymmetric Nash equilibrium in emission rights auctions

Congjun Rao, Yong Zhao and Chuanfeng Li

Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 2012, vol. 79, issue 3, 429-435

Abstract: This paper studies the problems of emission rights auctions, and presents a uniform price auction mechanism based on three assumptions, i.e., all buyers are asymmetric, every buyer submits a nonincreasing continuous demand function, and every buyer's valuation to per unit of the emission rights is common value information. It focuses on solving the asymmetric Nash equilibrium for this auction mechanism. It concludes that there exist multiple Nash equilibria in our auction mechanism, but the arbitrary low equilibrium prices cannot emerge. We also give several suggestions on how to induce the auction to a desired ideal equilibrium state in mechanism design of emission rights auctions.

Keywords: Emission rights auctions; Uniform price auction; Asymmetric Nash equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S004016251100179X
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:tefoso:v:79:y:2012:i:3:p:429-435

DOI: 10.1016/j.techfore.2011.08.012

Access Statistics for this article

Technological Forecasting and Social Change is currently edited by Fred Phillips

More articles in Technological Forecasting and Social Change from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().