Lessons from the Nigerian GSM auction

Darin Lee

Telecommunications Policy, vol. 27, issue 5-6, 407-416

Abstract: The recent Nigerian GSM auction was the first spectrum auction to use a variation of the "Anglo-Dutch" auction format, which combines elements of the ascending and sealed bid formats. For the Nigerian Communication Commission (NCC), this auction represented a watershed event, as it was the first time the NCC had used an auction to allocate radio spectrum. In this paper, we relate a number of last minute changes in the auction rules and discuss them in the context of the stated objectives of the NCC. Moreover, we show how the experience of the Nigerian GSM auction can provide valuable insight to telecommunications policy makers into some of the challenges facing auction designers and administrators.

Keywords: Spectrum; Auctions; Nigeria; GSM; Anglo-Dutch; Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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