 Evolution of cooperation with respect to fixation probabilities in multi-player games with random payoffsDhaker Kroumi, Martin, Éloi and Sabin Lessard Theoretical Population Biology, 2022, vol. 145, issue C, 1-21 Abstract: We study the effect of variability in payoffs on the evolution of cooperation (C) against defection (D) in multi-player games in a finite well-mixed population. We show that an increase in the covariance between any two payoffs to D, or a decrease in the covariance between any two payoffs to C, increases the probability of ultimate fixation of C when represented once, and decreases the corresponding fixation probability for D. This is also the case with an increase in the covariance between any payoff to C and any payoff to D if and only if the sum of the numbers of C-players in the group associated with these payoffs is large enough compared to the group size. In classical social dilemmas with random cost and benefit for cooperation, the evolution of C is more likely to occur if the variances of the cost and benefit, as well as the group size, are small, while the covariance between cost and benefit is large. Keywords: Moran model; Public goods game; Stag hunt game; Snowdrift game; Synergistic benefits (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:thpobi:v:145:y:2022:i:c:p:1-21 DOI: 10.1016/j.tpb.2022.02.001 Access Statistics for this article Theoretical Population Biology is currently edited by Jeremy Van Cleve More articles in Theoretical Population Biology from Elsevier |
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