 Effects of encounter in a population of spatial prisoner’s dilemma playersChunyan Zhang, Jianlei Zhang, Guangming Xie and Long Wang Theoretical Population Biology, 2011, vol. 80, issue 3, 226-231 Abstract: We study the evolution of cooperation in spatial prisoner’s dilemma games, whereby each player extends its interaction scope by trying to interact with a certain number of encounters randomly chosen from its non-neighbors, in addition to its permanently linked nearest neighbors. Furthermore, the non-neighbors treat the initiative interactions in two scenarios: definitely accepting that from the cooperators, whereas guardedly interacting with defectors with an acceptance probability which may take arbitrary value in [0,1]. Importantly, our results reveal that the proposed encounter mechanism is a potent extrinsic factor that is able to boost cooperation when appropriately adjusting the values of the encounter number and acceptance probability, though rational players would always defect in one-shot encounters, regardless of the action from the counterparts. We hope our studies may help understand that the proposed encounter mechanism is also an important ingredient of a flourishing cooperative society. Keywords: Evolutionary game theory; Evolution; Strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:thpobi:v:80:y:2011:i:3:p:226-231 DOI: 10.1016/j.tpb.2011.06.007 Access Statistics for this article Theoretical Population Biology is currently edited by Jeremy Van Cleve More articles in Theoretical Population Biology from Elsevier |
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