Stochastic stability and the evolution of coordination in spatially structured populations

Jeremy Van Cleve and Laurent Lehmann

Theoretical Population Biology, 2013, vol. 89, issue C, 75-87

Abstract: Animals can often coordinate their actions to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes. However, this can result in a social dilemma when uncertainty about the behavior of partners creates multiple fitness peaks. Strategies that minimize risk (“risk dominant†) instead of maximizing reward (“payoff dominant†) are favored in economic models when individuals learn behaviors that increase their payoffs. Specifically, such strategies are shown to be “stochastically stable†(a refinement of evolutionary stability).

Keywords: Risk dominance; Relatedness; n-player game; Stag hunt (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:thpobi:v:89:y:2013:i:c:p:75-87

DOI: 10.1016/j.tpb.2013.08.006

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