Behavioral mechanism design for transportation services: Laboratory experiments and preference elicitation cost

Yusuke Hara

Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, 2018, vol. 115, issue C, 231-245

Abstract: We herein use the results of laboratory experiments to study the effects of preference-elicitation mechanisms on the efficiency of auctions. Transportation and reservation service providers need to know the potential user demand. However, the preference-elicitation method can impact the elicitation results. In this study, we experimentally analyze the effects of preference-elicitation mechanisms on users’ eliciting behaviors and on the efficiency of auction results. In addition, we show that our preference-elicitation mechanism can reduce users’ bidding cost and improve the efficiency of auction results. Finally, we examine users’ behaviors in laboratory experiments to estimate their preference-elicitation costs.

Keywords: Behavioral mechanism design; Transportation service auction; Preference elicitation; Laboratory experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1016/j.trb.2018.07.008

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