Non-aviation revenues and their implications for airport regulation

Uwe Kratzsch and Gernot Sieg

Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, 2011, vol. 47, issue 5, 755-763

Abstract: This paper analyzes a non-congested private airport that possesses market power in providing aeronautical services. We find that the profit-maximizing landing fee decreases in the degree of complementarity of aviation and non-aviation. Furthermore, our model implies that airports will not take advantage of their market power if non-aviation revenues, or the degree of complementarity of aviation and non-aviation, exceed a critical threshold. In this case, a dual-till regulation will be unnecessary. A single-till regulation, on the other hand, will always result in lower landing fees than laissez-faire.

Keywords: Airport; pricing; Airport; regulation; Dual-till; Landing; fee; Non-aviation; revenue; Single-till (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1366554511000378
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:transe:v:47:y:2011:i:5:p:755-763

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/600244/bibliographic
http://www.elsevier. ... 600244/bibliographic

Access Statistics for this article

Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review is currently edited by W. Talley

More articles in Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().