Fiscal Decentralization in Rentier Regions: Evidence from Russia

Lev Freinkman and Alexander Plekhanov

World Development, 2009, vol. 37, issue 2, 503-512

Abstract: Summary The paper argues that governments in regions that rely heavily on intergovernmental transfers and natural resource rents face serious distortions in their incentive structure. As a result, such regions tend to have more fiscally centralized governments than the regional characteristics would suggest. Data on Russian regions in the late 1990s--early 2000s support this hypothesis. Advancing intraregional fiscal decentralization in rentier regions could reduce policy distortions, and make the subnational environment more supportive of economic development.

Keywords: decentralization; rent-dependence; windfall; oil; producers; Russia (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:37:y:2009:i:2:p:503-512

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