Who is Vouching for the Input Voucher? Decentralized Targeting and Elite Capture in Tanzania

Lei Pan () and Luc Christiaensen

World Development, 2012, vol. 40, issue 8, 1619-1633

Abstract: Through decentralized targeting of input vouchers new agricultural input subsidy programs aim to more effectively reach their objectives and target population. But, lingering fears of elite capture remain. These are borne out in the 2009 input voucher program in Kilimanjaro, Tanzania. Sixty percent of the voucher beneficiaries were households with village officials. This significantly reduced the targeting performance of the program, especially in unequal and remote communities. When targeting the poor, greater coverage and concentration in higher trust settings mitigated these concerns. Scrutiny remains important when relying on decentralized targeting, as is a clearer sense of purpose of input vouchers.

Keywords: local elite; decentralization; targeting; fertilizer; voucher program; Tanzania (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (67)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:40:y:2012:i:8:p:1619-1633

DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2012.04.012

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