Who is Vouching for the Input Voucher? Decentralized Targeting and Elite Capture in Tanzania
Lei Pan (panlei0411@gmail.com) and
Luc Christiaensen
No 122905, 2012 Conference, August 18-24, 2012, Foz do Iguacu, Brazil from International Association of Agricultural Economists
Abstract:
Through decentralized targeting of input vouchers new agricultural input subsidy programs aim to more effectively reach their objectives and target population. But, lingering fears of elite capture remain. These are borne out in the 2009 input voucher program in Kilimanjaro, Tanzania. Sixty percent of the voucher beneficiaries were households with village officials. This significantly reduced the targeting performance of the program, especially in unequal and remote communities. When targeting the poor, greater coverage and concentration in higher trust settings mitigated these concerns. Scrutiny remains important when relying on decentralized targeting, as is a clearer sense of purpose of input vouchers.
Keywords: International Development; Public Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41
Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-afr
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (84)
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Journal Article: Who is Vouching for the Input Voucher? Decentralized Targeting and Elite Capture in Tanzania (2012) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:iaae12:122905
DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.122905
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