The “credibility” of the antiinflationary economic policy and its temporal consistency

Arthur Barrionuevo Filho ()

Brazilian Journal of Political Economy, 1994, vol. 14, issue 1, 130-143

Abstract: This article is a survey about the consequences of the credibility of governmentpolicies, one of the main developments in macroeconomic theory in the 80s. New classicaleconomists used it to explain why, in the long-run, government policies fail when they intendto increase the level of employment above the natural rate. Even in the short run, theyonly achieve their aims if it is possible to cheat the private sector. The result will be to losecredibility and inflationary pressures. Other authors developed it as a tool to understandthe relationship between government, political parties and pressure groups with economicpolicy. Finally, we comment some papers about the Brazilian inflation based on distributiveconflict and compare them with explanations from credibility of policies. JEL Classification: E31; E52.

Keywords: Credibility; stabilization; inflation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994
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