Central Bank independence and monetary discipline: skeptical observations

Fernando J. Cardim de Carvalho ()

Brazilian Journal of Political Economy, 1995, vol. 15, issue 4, 600-608

Abstract: Orthodox conventional wisdom related to monetary policy in the 1990s presentsthe independence of central banks as a condition for achieving durable price stability, as it didwith respect to the adoption of fixed rules for monetary growth in the 1980s. The paper proceedsto a critical examination of the arguments, in which it is concluded that, besides the undesirablepolitical implications of the proposal, the thesis is too dependent on specious and fragileconcepts as the natural rate of unemployment and the allegedly inherent inflationary biasof monetary authorities as well as on a very narrow view of the role of monetary authorities. JEL Classification: E58; E52.

Keywords: Monetary policy; central bank autonomy; political economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1995
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ekm:repojs:v:15:y:1995:i:4:p:600-608:id:1261

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