Central banking, democratic governance and polítical authority: case of Brazil in a regional perspective

Lourdes Sola (), Christopher Garman () and Moises Marques ()

Brazilian Journal of Political Economy, 1998, vol. 18, issue 2, 321-348

Abstract: By examining the relationship between democratic governance and monetaryauthority this paper accomplishes two principal tasks. First, it justifies placing the study ofmonetary authority as a central item on the research agenda of political scientists. Beginningfrom the premise central banks constitute a special mode of political authority, we examinetrade-offs between questions of transparency, democratic accountability, and public sectorefficiency. Second, by conducting an empirical study of monetary authority for the Braziliancase, the paper inverts a commonly held assumption within the study of central banks. Ratherthan argue price stability follows from an autonomous central bank, the Brazilian casedemonstrate nearly the opposite can take place. JEL Classification: E58.

Keywords: Central bank; central bank autonomy; monetary policy; political economy; accountability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ekm:repojs:v:18:y:1998:i:2:p:321-348:id:1138

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