Central Bank independence and policy coordination: advantages and disadvantages of two structures for stabilization

Helder de Mendonça ()

Brazilian Journal of Political Economy, 2003, vol. 23, issue 1, 112-123

Abstract: Nowadays, the orthodox conventional wisdom believes that the adoption of an independent central bank improves the alignment of fiscal policy with monetary policy, and thus, increases the coordination between fiscal and monetary authorities. However, the idea of coordination cannot be reduced to this. This paper makes a brief analysis concerning the advantages and disadvantages that belong to the independence of the central bank proposition and coordination between monetary and fiscal policies. The findings denote that the coordination of policies is a better framework to achieve the several macroeconomic goals. JEL Classification: E52; E58; E61.

Keywords: Independence of central bank; coordination; macroeconomic policies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ekm:repojs:v:23:y:2003:i:1:p:112-123:id:891

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