Ownership and control structure of publicly traded companies in Brazil

Dante Mendes Aldrighi () and Roberto Mazzer Neto ()

Brazilian Journal of Political Economy, 2005, vol. 25, issue 2, 115-137

Abstract: This paper has as its main objective to measure the magnitude of deviations between control rights and cash-flow rights for the ultimate shareholder with the largest voting rights of limited liability companies in Brazil. Furthermore, it pinpoints how these discrepancies are generated, evaluating the relative importance of the issuance of preferred stocks with no voting rights, pyramidal arrangements of ownership, and cross-shareholdings. The data set embraces 602 companies that in 2001 complied with the mandatory requirement of filing to the CVM. JEL Classification: G32.

Keywords: Cash-flow Rights; Control Rights; Controlling Shareholder; Pyramidal Arrangements; Minority Shareholders; No-voting-rights preferem shares; ownership structure; voting arrengments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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