Central Bank Independence and Fiscal equilibrium

Helder de Mendonça ()

Brazilian Journal of Political Economy, 2006, vol. 26, issue 1, 23-38

Abstract: The objective of this paper is to analyze the main theoretical arguments for the analysis of the conduction of monetary policy on the fiscal side. Besides this, an analysis is made of the possible effects on the fiscal balance from the conduction of the monetary policy in the search for price stability after the Real Plan and due to an increase in the central bank independence (CBI) in the Brazilian case. The findings denote that the strategy for the conduction of the adopted monetary policy and the increase in the degree of CBI did not contribute to an improvement in the fiscal balance. JEL Classification: E58; E63.

Keywords: central bank independence; inflation; public debt (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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