The effects of Central Bank independence and the rate of turnover on the Brazilian inflation

Helder de Mendonça ()

Brazilian Journal of Political Economy, 2006, vol. 26, issue 4, 552- 563

Abstract: Nowadays, the belief is strong in the Brazilian federal government that operational central bank independence is a basic condition to assure price stability. The literature concerning this subject highlights that a high degree of independence and a low turnover of central bank governor are associated with low inflation. This paper analyzes the relation between central bank independence and inflation in Brazil during 1980-2002. The findings denote that there is no effect on inflation due to an increase in degree of independence and a fall in turnover rate. JEL Classification: E58.

Keywords: central bank independence; inflation; turnover of central bank governors (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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