 Federalism and subnational indebtednessMônica Mora () and Fabio Giambiagi () Brazilian Journal of Political Economy, 2007, vol. 27, issue 3, 472-494 Abstract: The subnational debt in Brazil was marked by successive bailouts by the federal government. The path of subnational debt induced some locals and state authorities to claim for further renegotiations. More specifically, some governors and mayors demanded a revision of the refinancing contracts. This article intends to present arguments sustained by simulations of the evolution of the path of the subnational debt, denying the necessity of changes in legal framework which rules the state debt. The first section consists of a brief overview. The following section treats of the institutional framework designed to safeguard the fiscal intertemporal balance. In the third section, the implications of new institutional framework on the subnational debt are approached; in the fourth, the possible causes that distorted the expected path of the debt are discussed. The fifth section analyzes the future perspectives for the debt in general terms and focuses some specific cases, while the sixth section discusses the problem under a federal optics. Finally, the conclusion is presented. JEL Classification: H74; H77; H63. Keywords: Federalism; subnational debt; intergovernmental relations (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ekm:repojs:v:27:y:2007:i:3:p:472-494:id:576 Access Statistics for this article More articles in Brazilian Journal of Political Economy from Center of Political Economy |
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