The effect of reelection intention on public health expenditures

Lucas Novaes and Enlinson Mattos

Brazilian Journal of Political Economy, 2010, vol. 30, issue 1, 140-158

Abstract: The political model of reputational-building argues that if the incumbent politician aspires to be reassigned, he/she must act in the voters’ interest to obtain their approval and consequently their votes. Considering that voters are sensitive to public health expenditures, we check how reputational incentives shift municipal spending patterns in electoral years. The empirical tests for 3004 Brazilian municipalities show an increase of health expenditures in those cities in which incumbents are trying to maintain their jobs. In addition, we find an increment in health expenditures where mayors forfeit their chance of being reelected to the benefit of a party mate. JEL Classification: D72; H51; H72; I18.

Keywords: electoral control; reelection; political agency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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