Administered Prices and Government Discretion

Paulo Azevedo and Felipe C. Serigati ()

Brazilian Journal of Political Economy, 2015, vol. 35, issue 3, 510-530

Abstract: Administered prices during the first term of President Dilma were used as an instrument to meet inflation target, so as to subordinate industrial policies to short run macroeconomic aims. This strategy was ineffective to control inflation and distorted investment and consumption decisions. The article shows that prices tend to deviate more the larger their weight in the price index, and tend to vary consistently with the political cycles. The article concludes with policy suggestions to control the negative effect of deviations of government discretion to determine administered prices. JEL Classification: E31; L32.

Keywords: administered prices; inflation target; government discretion; electoral cycles (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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