Behavioral economics of corruption and its implications

Roberta Muramatsu () and Ana Bianchi ()

Brazilian Journal of Political Economy, 2021, vol. 41, issue 1, 100-116

Abstract: This paper holds that the standard economic accounts of corruption based on expected costs and benefits are insufficient to understand and to tackle dishonesty in the real world. It embarks on a survey of the literature to discuss the major roles automatic judgments and decisions, as well as cognitive biases and social preferences might play in deviations from honest behavior. The paper further discusses the implications of behavioral economics to the debate over how to fight corruption and foster integrity. JEL Classification: B40; B41; D90; D91.

Keywords: Behavioral economics; corruption; methodology; experiments; policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://centrodeeconomiapolitica.org.br/repojs/ind ... ticle/view/2122/2192 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ekm:repojs:v:41:y:2021:i:1:p:100-116:id:2122

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Brazilian Journal of Political Economy from Center of Political Economy
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Brazilian Journal of Political Economy (Brazil) ().