Evaluating the effects of asymmetric information in a model of crop insurance

Adeyemi Esuola, Michael Hoy, Zahirul Islam and Calum Turvey

Agricultural Finance Review, 2007, vol. 67, issue 2, 341-356

Abstract: Keywords: Adverse selection, Crop insurance, Moral hazard

Date: 2007
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Working Paper: Evaluating the Effects of Asymmetric Information in a Model of Crop Insurance (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eme:afrpps:v:67:y:2007:i:2:p:341-356

DOI: 10.1108/00214660780001212

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