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Market power, dismissal threat, and rent sharing: The role of insider and outsider forces in wage bargaining

Anabela Carneiro () and Pedro Portugal

International Journal of Manpower, 2008, vol. 29, issue 1, 30-47

Abstract: Purpose - The purpose of this study is to investigate to what extent the existence of high labor adjustment costs has some influence on the process of wage negotiation. In particular, it aims to analyse if the risk of being laid off has any impact on insiders' bargaining power and, consequently, on their wage claims. Design/methodology/approach - A collective bargaining model that closely follows those developed by Nickell Findings - The results reveal that firms where insider workers appear to have more bargaining power tend to pay higher wages. In particular, we found that the threat of dismissal tends to weaken insiders' bargaining power and, consequently, to depress wages. Research limitations/implications - In future research an attempt should be made to measure directly the labor turnover costs. Originality/value - This paper presents robust empirical evidence using micro-data for individual firms that support one of the predictions of the insider-outsider theory that wages will be higher in sectors (firms) with high labor turnover costs.

Keywords: Pay bargaining; Market forces; Dismissal; Rents; Portugal (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Related works:
Working Paper: Market Power, Dismissal Threat and Rent Sharing: The Role of Insider and Outsider Forces in Wage Bargaining (2006) Downloads
Working Paper: Market Power, Dismissal Threat and Rent Sharing: The Role of Insider and Outsider Forces in Wage Bargaining (2006) Downloads
Working Paper: Market Power, Dismissal Threat, and Rent Sharing: the Role of Insider and Outsider Forces in Wage Bargaining (2004)
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