The corporate governance of banks

Andy Mullineux

Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, 2006, vol. 14, issue 4, 375-382

Abstract: Purpose - To consider the implications of the banks fiduciary duty to their depositors (as well as the shareholders) and the government's fiscal duty to taxpayers (in the presence of deposit insurance) for the corporate governance (CG) of banks. Design/methodology/approach - Recent contributions to the literature are outlined and assessed in the context of the asymmetric information literature relating to banking. Findings - The good CG of banks requires regulation to balance the interests of depositors and taxpayers with those of the shareholders. Originality/value - Linking the bank regulation in literature based on information asymmetry to the CG literature.

Keywords: Banks; Corporate governance; Regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eme:jfrcpp:13581980610711144

DOI: 10.1108/13581980610711144

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