Incentivising compliance functions: regulatory design, enforcement practice and the public interest under the FCA framework

Alon Kohalny and Gabriel Sayag

Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, 2026, 1-23

Abstract: PurposeThis study aims to examine whether the FCA’s use of in-house compliance functions as a delivery tool for regulation reduces compliance risk and serves the public interest.Design/methodology/approachThis study combines doctrinal analysis of the FCA’s systems and controls requirements with examination of selected enforcement decisions. Concepts from regulatory design and incentive-based regulation are used to interpret how expectations are articulated and how responsibility is distributed between firms and individuals.FindingsThe analysis suggests the presence of a design-enforcement gap. While firms are incentivised ex ante to establish compliance functions as indicators of sound governance, enforcement practice evaluates those functions ex post against indeterminate, outcome-oriented standards. This misalignment may weaken the logic of incentive-based regulation, encourage symbolic compliance and contribute to the individualisation of regulatory risk for compliance officers.Research limitations/implicationsThis study is limited to qualitative analysis of selected enforcement decisions. Its contribution lies in identifying structural features of compliance-based regulation rather than measuring empirical outcomes.Practical implicationsThis study proposes a structured way of assessing compliance functions, focusing on their actual performance. This paper sets out dimensions that could guide supervision and enforcement in a more predictable and preventative way.Originality/valueThis study links regulatory design, incentive structures and enforcement practice to explain structural weaknesses in the FCA’s current use of compliance functions and offers a framework that could be used by regulators and firms in the UK and beyond.

Keywords: Financial conduct authority; Compliance officers; Compliance regulation; Enforcement practice; Financial crime prevention; Regulatory incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eme:jfrcpp:jfrc-02-2026-0098

DOI: 10.1108/JFRC-02-2026-0098

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