Co‐operative and competitive enforced self regulation

Marianne Ojo

Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, 2011, vol. 19, issue 2, 139-155

Abstract: Purpose - The primary purpose of the paper is to demonstrate how corporate responsibility and accountability could be fostered through monitoring and the involvement of governments in the regulation of firms. Design/methodology/approach - In considering why practices which stimulate incentives for private agents to exert corporate control should be encouraged, this paper highlights criticisms attributed to government control of banks. However, the theory relating to the “helping hand” view of government is advanced as having a fundamental role in the regulation and supervision of banks. Findings - Governments have a vital role to play in corporate responsibility and regulation given the fact that banks are costly and difficult to monitor – this being principally attributed to the possibility that private agents will lack required incentives or the ability to supervise banks. Research limitations/implications - Banks are costly and difficult to monitor – this being principally attributed to the possibility that private agents will lack required incentives or the ability to supervise banks. Practical implications - The paper illustrates how structures which operate in various systems, namely, stock market economies and universal banking systems, function (and attempt) to address gaps which may arise as a result of lack of adequate mechanisms of accountability. Social implications - The paper also draws attention to the impact of asymmetric information (generally and in these systems), on levels of monitoring procedures and how conflicts of interests which could arise between banks and their shareholders, or between governments and those firms being regulated by the regulator, could be addressed. Originality/value - Through its supervision of banks, governments also assume an important role where matters related to the fostering of accountability are concerned – not only because banks may have the power to affect firm performance, but also because some private agents are not able to afford internal monitoring mechanisms.

Keywords: Management accountability; Banking; Regulation; Government (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.110 ... d&utm_campaign=repec (text/html)
https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.110 ... d&utm_campaign=repec (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eme:jfrcpp:v:19:y:2011:i:2:p:139-155

DOI: 10.1108/13581981111123852

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance is currently edited by Prof John Ashton

More articles in Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance from Emerald Group Publishing Limited
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Emerald Support ().