 Window dressing in mutual fund portfolios: fact or fiction?Seung Hee Choi and Maneesh Chhabria Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, 2013, vol. 21, issue 2, 136-149 Abstract: Purpose - Congress and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have mandated mutual fund disclosure regimes to help investors make better investment decisions to strike an optimal balance between the investors' interest in more timely and accurate portfolio holdings disclosure and the cost associated with making and disclosing the holdings information available to investors. Many academics and practitioners point out that, despite all the regulations on portfolio disclosure, fund managers can still engage in practices that go against the spirit of the rules without violating the letter of the law. The purpose of this paper is to address the empirical question of whether the practice exists, using holdings data for more than 3,000 equity mutual funds during the time period from 1995 to 2004. Design/methodology/approach - In this paper, the authors examine window dressing by mutual fund portfolio managers, using holdings data covering more than 3,000 equity mutual funds from 1995 to 2004. The authors first investigate whether the fund holdings are materially different from universe holdings across performance quintiles based on holdings in the month of disclosure and in the following month. The second part of the analysis examines funds' patterns of buying and selling. Finally, the measure of “Buying Intensity” and “Selling Intensity” is examined, with a specific focus on the holdings data for the fourth quarter. Findings - An examination of fund holdings finds no statistically significant evidence of systematic window dressing, either at the aggregate level or within subsamples of funds based on size or past performance. Rather, it was found that fund managers tend to chase momentum. A combination of investor sophistication and market oversight may serve to be effective in dissuading fund managers from engaging in the practice. Originality/value - The authors' data are at the individual fund level, based on equity mutual funds holdings data provided to Morningstar on a quarterly or monthly basis (according to Eltonet al., the Morningstar database provides timely and accurate mutual fund holdings information). These data allow us to infer better the investment manager intentvis‐à‐visusing 13F data, which is aggregate data across various fund families and separate accounts, or aggregate pension fund equity holdings data that includes aggregate holdings of multiple portfolio managers. In addition, the authors comment on the significance of the regulatory checks and balances that are designed to restrict fund managers' ability to window‐dress their portfolios. In summary, the combination of quantitative evidence from empirical tests and an examination of the legal framework under which mutual fund portfolio managers operate, lead to the conclusion that window dressing is not prevalent in the industry. Keywords: United States of America; Fund management; Disclosure; Mutual funds; Window dressing; Portfolio disclosure; Fund performance (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eme:jfrcpp:v:21:y:2013:i:2:p:136-149 DOI: 10.1108/13581981311315550 Access Statistics for this article Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance is currently edited by Prof John Ashton More articles in Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance from Emerald Group Publishing Limited |
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