The conundrum of legislating risk reduction through financial regulatory reform
James F. Gilsinan,
Neil Seitz,
James Fisher,
Muhammad Q. Islam and
James Millar
Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, 2013, vol. 21, issue 2, 150-163
Abstract:
Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to examine the legislative process, in order to determine the likely effectiveness of financial reform efforts in the USA. Design/methodology/approach - Case study of the legislative process, particularly the less visible parts such as rule making, that shaped the passage and implementation of the Dodd‐Frank Act and the failed Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) reform. Findings - It is found that the process of financial reform legislation is structured in such a way as to thwart major reform, at least in the short run. Practical implications - The passage of a particular piece of legislation may be the least important element in the process of reform. Rule making and the decisions as to how a law will be implemented, can advance or significantly defeat the quest for change. Social implications - Much of what occurs in the legislative process is invisible, or appears arcane, to the ordinary citizen but can have major impact on their lives. Originality/value - The paper provides a road map to understanding the least visible parts of financial reform efforts and suggests ways of achieving reform outcomes.
Keywords: Legislation; United States of America; Accounting standards; Financial regulation; Financial reform; Accountability; Rule making; Transparency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eme:jfrcpp:v:21:y:2013:i:2:p:150-163
DOI: 10.1108/13581981311315659
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