The insurance agents’ intention to make inappropriate product recommendations

Lu-Ming Tseng, Yue-Min Kang and Chi-Erh Chung

Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, 2016, vol. 24, issue 3, 230-247

Abstract: Purpose - This case study aim to investigate the impacts of insurance agents’ positive attitude toward inappropriate product recommendations on the insurance agents’ intention to make the inappropriate product recommendations. This study further checks how the attitude and intention could be enhanced by the insurer’s manipulation of sales compensations, the agents’ perception of information asymmetry between customers and insurance agents and the insurer’s sales orientation. Design/methodology/approach - Full-time insurance agents from the life insurance industry in Taiwan were surveyed. To test the hypotheses, hierarchical regression analyses were used in the study. Findings - The main results showed that the respondents’ positive attitude toward inappropriate product recommendations was the influential predictor of the respondents’ behavioral intention. Nevertheless, the positive attitude was enhanced by the manipulation of sales compensations and the insurer’s sales orientation. Originality/value - Very few studies have investigated the relationships among information asymmetry between customers and agents, management’s sales orientation, management’s manipulation of sales compensations and the problems of selling unsuitable insurance products to customers. This study may contribute to the relevant literature by discussing these issues.

Keywords: Product recommendation; Sales compensation; Information asymmetry; Insurance; Sales orientation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eme:jfrcpp:v:24:y:2016:i:3:p:230-247

DOI: 10.1108/JFRC-03-2015-0014

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